Antitrust – Page 6 – artdiamondblog.com

Mackey Reduced Role in Whole Foods after Being “Drained” by Antitrust Battle

“Higher existing-store sales powered Whole Foods earnings. Above, co-founder John Mackey juggles apples in a New York store last November.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. B6) Whole Foods Market Inc. reported Wednesday that fiscal second-quarter profits had more than doubled and raised its full-year earnings forecast. The company also shook up its management team, naming a co-chief executive, though current CEO and co-founder John Mackey said he expects to work “for another decade or so.”
. . .
Mr. Mackey in December resigned as Whole Foods’ chairman after a year of controversy. Last summer, he wrote a controversial opinion article for The Wall Street Journal on his views of health care reform that led to boycotts of the natural grocer by some of his most loyal shoppers. Last spring, the Fair Trade Commission ordered the sale of 37 former Wild Oats Markets Inc. stores, a multi-year battle that Mr. Mackey says left him drained and influenced his decision to appoint Mr. Robb as co-CEO.

For the full story, see:
TIMOTHY W. MARTIN. “Profit Soars at Whole Foods; Grocery Chain Forecasts Sharply Higher Profit, Promotes Two Veteran Executives.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., MAY 13, 2010): B6.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the first paragraph quoted above has slightly different wording in the online version than the print version; the second paragraph quoted is the same in both.)

Competitors Have “Incentive to Misuse the Government to Obtain an Advantage”

(p. A15) Today’s technology behemoth risks becoming tomorrow’s dinosaur, and competitors sometimes plead for government intervention to obtain what they fail to achieve in the market. As a former head of a competition agency, I offer . . . principles to guide competition policy toward successful innovators.

. . . , be wary of competitor complaints. When a competitor tells government that its rival acts unfairly, the complaint should be viewed with great suspicion. Competitor complaints are driving recent EU investigations into companies that include Qualcomm, Google, Oracle and IBM. Competitors can provide valuable information about marketplace realities, but they have every incentive to misuse the government to obtain an advantage that is otherwise unattainable.
. . .
. . . , don’t create disincentives for innovation. Complaining competitors often want innovators to be forced to share the source of their success, regardless of intellectual property rights. Nothing could be more destructive to the incentives for future innovation than rules that prevent innovators from reaping the full benefits of their work. As a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court said in its 2004 Verizon v. Trinko decision, “[f]irms may acquire monopoly power by establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.”

For the full commentary, see:
TIMOTHY J. MURIS. “Antitrust in a High-Tech World; The first rule of regulators should be to be wary of complaints from competitors..” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., August 12, 2010): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Doctors Seek to Regulate Retail Health Clinic Competitors

“A nurse practitioner with a patient at a retail clinic in Wilmington, Del.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

Clayton Christensen, in a chapter of Seeing What’s Next, and at greater length in The Innovator’s Prescription, has persuasively advocated the evolution of nurse practitioners and retail health clinics as disruptive innovations that have the potential to improve the quality and reduce the costs of health care.
An obstacle to the realization of Christensen’s vision would be government regulation demanded by health care incumbents who would rather not have to compete with nurse practitioners and retail health clinics. See below for more:

(p. B1) Retail health clinics are adding treatments for chronic diseases such as asthma to their repertoire, hoping to find steadier revenue, but putting the clinics into greater competition with doctors’ groups and hospitals.

Walgreen Co.’s Take Care retail clinic recently started a pilot program in Tampa and Orlando offering injected and infused drugs for asthma and osteoporosis to Medicare patients. At some MinuteClinics run by CVS Caremark Corp., nurse practitioners now counsel teenagers about acne, recommend over-the-counter products and sometimes prescribe antibiotics.
. . .
As part of their efforts to halt losses at the clinics, the chains are lobbying for more insurance coverage, and angling for a place in pending health-care reform legislation, while trying to temper calls for regulations.
. . .
(p. B2) But such moves are raising the ire of physicians’ groups that see the in-store clinics as inappropriate venues for treating complex illnesses. In May, the Massachusetts Medical Society urged its members to press insurance companies on co-payments to eliminate any financial incentive to use retail clinics.
. . .
The clinics are helping alter the practice of medicine. Doctors are expanding office hours to evenings and weekends. Hospitals are opening more urgent-care centers to treat relatively minor health problems.

For the full story, see:
AMY MERRICK. “Retail Health Clinics Move to Treat Complex Illnesses, Rankling Doctors.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., SEPTEMBER 10, 2009): B1-B2.
(Note: ellipses added.)

A brief commentary by Christensen (and Hwang) on these issues, can be found at:

CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN and JASON HWANG. “How CEOs Can Help Fix Health Care.” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., July 28, 2009).

For the full account, see:
Christensen, Clayton M., Jerome H. Grossman, and Jason Hwang. The Innovator’s Prescription: A Disruptive Solution for Health Care. New York: NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008.

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited above.

Justice Department is Creating Barriers to Companies Trying to Create New Technologies

Intel CEO Craig Barrett. Source of caricature: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. A9) Craig Barrett is spending the last days of his tenure as Intel chairman the same way he spent his previous 35 years at the corporation: moving at a superhuman pace that leaves exhausted subordinates in his wake.

Mr. Barrett has maintained this lifestyle since he replaced Andrew Grove as CEO of Intel in 1998. “Was it hard to follow a legend?” he asks himself in his typical blunt way, adding, “What do you think?” Mr. Barrett barely broke pace when he became chairman in 2005, and shows no sign of slowing even now, at age 69, as he faces retirement.
. . .
The latest thing that has him animated is the record $1.45 billion antitrust fine levied against Intel by the European Union this week. Mr. Barrett shakes his head and says, “The antitrust rules and regulations seem designed for a different era. When you look at high-tech companies, with the high R&D budgets, specialization and market creation they need to hold their big market shares, it’s so very different from the old world of oil companies and auto makers that the antitrust regulations were designed for. They are out of sync with reality.
“And how do you reconcile European regulators, who don’t believe that any company should have more than 50% market share — even a market that company created — with the way we operate here? Of course, now it seems as if our Justice Department is preparing to march in lock-step behind Europe. In the end, all they are going to do is create barriers to companies growing, entering into new markets, and bringing new technologies into those markets. And when we stop being the land of opportunity, all of those smart immigrant kids getting their Ph.D.s here are going to start heading home after they graduate. Then watch what happens to our competitiveness.”

For the full story, see:
MICHAEL S. MALONE. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Craig Barrett; From Moore’s Law to Barrett’s Rules; Intel’s chairman on antitrust silliness and the secrets of high-tech success.” Wall Street Journal (Sat., MARCH 16, 2009): A9.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Costs of Entry Were Low in Entrepreneurial Garment Industry in 1900

(p. 146) This was the second great advantage of the garment
industry. It wasn’t just that it was growing by leaps and bounds. It was also explicitly entrepreneurial. Clothes weren’t made in a single big factory. Instead, a number of established firms designed patterns and prepared the fabric, and then the complicated stitching and pressing and button attaching were all sent out to small contractors. And if a contractor got big enough, or ambitious enough, he started designing his own patterns and preparing his own fabric. By 1913, there were approximately (p. 147) sixteen thousand separate companies in New York City’s garment business, many just like the Borgenichts’ shop on Sheriff Street.

“The threshold for getting involved in the business was very low. It’s basically a business built on the sewing machine, and sewing machines don’t cost that much,” says Daniel Soyer, a historian who has written widely on the garment industry. “So you didn’t need a lot of capital. At the turn of the twentieth century, it was probably fifty dollars to buy a machine or two. All you had to do to be a contractor was to have a couple sewing machines, some irons, and a couple of workers. The profit margins were very low but you could make some money.”

Source:
Gladwell, Malcolm. Outliers: The Story of Success. New York, NY: Little, Brown, and Co., 2008.

Google Not Likely to Be “An Unstoppable Juggernaut”

Source of book image: online version of the WSJ review quoted and cited below.

(p. A25) But Messrs. Page and Brin, when they launched Google, had no idea how to make money from it. Two years into their venture, they developed a service that delivered small text ads based on the search terms that a user submitted. As Randall Stross notes in “Planet Google,” his even-handed and highly readable history of the company, the service proved to be a turning point in the history of advertising, offering ads tailored for “an audience of one at the one best moment, when a relevant topic was on the user’s mind.” It also proved to be a goldmine for Google. The company started serving up ads in 2000. In 2002, it had revenues of $400 million; in 2005, $6.1 billion; in 2007, $16.5 billion. Roughly 99% of its income stills springs from those modest text ads that appear at the top of Google’s results page.
. . .
Is Google an unstoppable juggernaut fated not only to “organize all information” — as the company has itself put its goal — but to control it as well? Mr. Stross poses the question but does not answer it. He notes that one of Google’s ambitions is to usher in an age of “cloud computing,” in which all the work we do on our personal computers would actually take place on servers that Google owns. The servers would hold the programs we use and store our data. That image — Google as Skynet from the “Terminator” movies — is a mite unsettling.

Yet the evidence in “Planet Google” suggests that this eventuality is less likely than Googlers might hope. Outside its core search and advertising business, Google has had few successes. Its home-grown products, such as Orkut, Knols and Google Checkout (knockoffs of Facebook, Wikipedia and PayPal, respectively), have largely been failures. Google’s biggest successes have come from acquisitions. Google bought YouTube only after its own attempt at video on the Web, Google Video, crashed and burned. And even the “successful” acquisitions that Google has made — Google Earth, Google Maps, Google Docs and Blogger were all purchases, too — have taken up resources without creating significant revenue.
. . .
Remember, people thought that Microsoft was fated to rule the world, too. Today, the once-feared operating-system giant is fighting to stay relevant. And the evolutionary parallels between Google and Microsoft are strikingly similar: Both hit upon a Big Idea at the perfect moment; both parlayed it into a mountain of cash; and both used the money to embark on a string of expansions that paid few dividends. The years have brought Microsoft back to Earth. They’ll probably do the same to Planet Google.

For the full review, see:
Last, Jonathan V. “BOOKS; Search for Tomorrow.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., SEPTEMBER 17, 2008): A25.
(Note: ellipses added.)

he book under review is:
Stross, Randall E. Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know. New York: Free Press, 2008.

European Bureaucrat Forces Businesses to Make “a Smart Business Decision”

If open standards are always “a smart business decision” why do business managers need government bureaucrats to force that decision on them (through fining firms, like Microsoft, that sometimes favor proprietary standards)?
In fact, there are circumstances in which open standards are better for customers, and there are also circumstances in which proprietary standards are better.
To better understand these issues consult Shapiro and Varian’s Information Rules and Christensen and Raynor’s The Innovator’s Solution.

(p. C8) BRUSSELS — The European Union’s competition commissioner, Neelie Kroes, delivered an unusually blunt rebuke to Microsoft on Tuesday by recommending that businesses and governments use software based on open standards.

Ms. Kroes has fought bitterly with Microsoft over the last four years, accusing the company of defying her orders and fining it nearly 1.7 billion euros, or $2.7 billion, on the grounds of violating European competition rules. But her comments were the strongest recommendation yet by Ms. Kroes to jettison Microsoft products, which are based on proprietary standards, and to use rival operating systems to run computers.
“I know a smart business decision when I see one — choosing open standards is a very smart business decision indeed,” Ms. Kroes told a conference in Brussels. “No citizen or company should be forced or encouraged to choose a closed technology over an open one.”

For the full story, see:
JAMES KANTER. “Harsh Words for Microsoft Technology.” The New York Times (Weds., June 11, 2008): C8.

References mentioned:
Christensen, Clayton M., and Michael E. Raynor. The Innovator’s Solution: Creating and Sustaining Successful Growth. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 2003.
Shapiro, Carl, and Hal R. Varian. Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1999.

Optimal Size of a Firm Depends on Trial and Error and Changing Circumstances

Rosenberg and Birdzell give an uncommon reason for economies of scale. This illustrated that the common list of reasons is not written in stone. As trial and error yields new ways of organizing business, the optimal size firm will shift back and forth.

(p. 157) The increase in both size and complexity of ironworks that followed throughout the nineteenth century was motivated by a desire to achieve economies in the use of fuel. As to size, within the practical limits of construction, large furnaces lose less heat by radiation than small furnaces and so are more fuel-efficient.

Source:
Rosenberg, Nathan, and L.E. Birdzell, Jr. How the West Grew Rich: The Economic Transformation of the Industrial World. New York: Basic Books, 1986.

Competition in an Ice Cream Duopoly

“Jose Martinez parked his Good Humor truck Tuesday at an Upper West Side corner that is said to be Mister Softee territory.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. C13) On Tuesday afternoon, new battle lines were drawn on the Upper West Side at the corner of Columbus Avenue and 83rd Street, where Ceasar Ruiz, 50, the Mister Softee man, said he had been selling ice cream without any competition for more than eight years.
He said his routine was the same every season. He arrives at the corner by about 2:30 each afternoon, mostly to catch the students getting out of Public School 9 and the Anderson School, just a few yards from the corner. He stays for about an hour and a half, then moves to his next location, he said.
But Tuesday afternoon was different. When he arrived, there sat the freshly painted Good Humor truck and Mr. Martinez, decked out in a crisp uniform, ringing his bell.
“I sell Good Humor, too,” Mr. Ruiz said. “But his is more cheap. I sell bar for $2. He might sell for $1.50. Not good. Not good.”
Over the din of children clamoring for Dora the Explorer ice cream bars and Mega Missile Pops (red, white and blue rocket-shaped popsicles), Mr. Martinez rang his bell louder, openly competing for customers.
“I’m trying to make a dollar just like he is,” said Mr. Martinez, his voice rising loud enough for the other driver to hear. “He’s telling me I have to go. But he doesn’t own this spot.”
. . .
About five minutes before 4 o’clock, Mr. Ruiz leaned out of his Mister Softee truck, looking over at Mr. Martinez.
“Tomorrow, I’m going to beat him here,” he said. “I’ll be the first one here.”

For the full story, see:
TRYMAINE LEE. “It’s Still Spring, but the Ice Cream Truck War Revs Up.” The New York Times (Weds., May 14, 2008): C13.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Google Does Evil: How to Succeed by Lobbying the Regulators

(p. A14) You’re saying to yourself, haven’t Google and friends been gnashing their teeth over the landline practices of the Verizons and Comcasts, demanding “net neutrality” regulations to be erected against crimes to be named later? Yes, and without much success. Consider a recent Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute study that found that imposing Google’s idea of “net neutrality” (i.e., restricting a network operator’s ability to prioritize urgent and non-urgent data) would end up cutting a network’s peak capacity in half.
Now Google and friends are turning to wireless, which they hope will prove a softer target. Here operators traditionally have built networks for the restricted purpose of letting customers make voice calls with an operator-supplied cellphone. But most operators have also started rolling out all-purpose broadband on their wireless networks, albeit high-priced and painfully slow (evidence of their need to ration capacity carefully to protect higher-priority voice traffic).
Verizon offers BroadbandAccess, a service that allows a customer, with a laptop card, to use Verizon’s wireless network for Web surfing. AT&T, T-Mobile and Sprint offer similar services. Likewise, Sprint and Clearwire are building out a new kind of wireless network, WiMax, for truly fast mobile broadband.
That’s not good enough for Google and its allies, who want the government to require wireless operators to provide unrestricted Web surfing to buyers of basic phone plans. Don’t be misled by the “net neutrality” and “open access” masquerades. This is nothing but business-model chauvinism, aided not a little by the mental clottedness of regulators, who evidently can be led to believe that any network operating on digital principles must be packaged and sold to customers in only one way.
. . .
Make no mistake: Google understands that restricting a wireless operator’s ability to design its own business model can, by definition, only reduce its incentive to invest. But Google has bigger fish to fry. It wants to make sure it can continue to free-ride on your broadband subscription bills, even in the mobile world. It wants to make sure it won’t have to share the proceeds of its massive search and advertising dominance with suppliers of network capacity.
Most of all, it wants to replicate in mobile search and advertising the overpowering position it has achieved in the fixed broadband world — something that might not be possible if wireless operators are left any opportunity to carve out a business model other than as simply suppliers of the proverbial “dumb pipe.”

For the full commentary, see:
Holman W. Jenkins, Jr. “Business World: Sort of Evil.” Wall Street Journal (Weds., July 18, 2007): A14.
(Note: ellipsis added.)