Books – Page 126 – artdiamondblog.com

Google Not Likely to Be “An Unstoppable Juggernaut”

Source of book image: online version of the WSJ review quoted and cited below.

(p. A25) But Messrs. Page and Brin, when they launched Google, had no idea how to make money from it. Two years into their venture, they developed a service that delivered small text ads based on the search terms that a user submitted. As Randall Stross notes in “Planet Google,” his even-handed and highly readable history of the company, the service proved to be a turning point in the history of advertising, offering ads tailored for “an audience of one at the one best moment, when a relevant topic was on the user’s mind.” It also proved to be a goldmine for Google. The company started serving up ads in 2000. In 2002, it had revenues of $400 million; in 2005, $6.1 billion; in 2007, $16.5 billion. Roughly 99% of its income stills springs from those modest text ads that appear at the top of Google’s results page.
. . .
Is Google an unstoppable juggernaut fated not only to “organize all information” — as the company has itself put its goal — but to control it as well? Mr. Stross poses the question but does not answer it. He notes that one of Google’s ambitions is to usher in an age of “cloud computing,” in which all the work we do on our personal computers would actually take place on servers that Google owns. The servers would hold the programs we use and store our data. That image — Google as Skynet from the “Terminator” movies — is a mite unsettling.

Yet the evidence in “Planet Google” suggests that this eventuality is less likely than Googlers might hope. Outside its core search and advertising business, Google has had few successes. Its home-grown products, such as Orkut, Knols and Google Checkout (knockoffs of Facebook, Wikipedia and PayPal, respectively), have largely been failures. Google’s biggest successes have come from acquisitions. Google bought YouTube only after its own attempt at video on the Web, Google Video, crashed and burned. And even the “successful” acquisitions that Google has made — Google Earth, Google Maps, Google Docs and Blogger were all purchases, too — have taken up resources without creating significant revenue.
. . .
Remember, people thought that Microsoft was fated to rule the world, too. Today, the once-feared operating-system giant is fighting to stay relevant. And the evolutionary parallels between Google and Microsoft are strikingly similar: Both hit upon a Big Idea at the perfect moment; both parlayed it into a mountain of cash; and both used the money to embark on a string of expansions that paid few dividends. The years have brought Microsoft back to Earth. They’ll probably do the same to Planet Google.

For the full review, see:
Last, Jonathan V. “BOOKS; Search for Tomorrow.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., SEPTEMBER 17, 2008): A25.
(Note: ellipses added.)

he book under review is:
Stross, Randall E. Planet Google: One Company’s Audacious Plan to Organize Everything We Know. New York: Free Press, 2008.

High Progressive Income Taxes Result in “Demoralization of Entrepreneurs”

(p. 127) High progressive and unnegotiable gouges like those in Sweden and England drive people altogether out of the country into offshore tax havens, out of income-generating activities into perks and leisure pursuits, out of money and savings into collectibles and gold, and, most important, out of small business ventures into the cosseting arms of large established corporations and government bureaucracies. The result is the demoralization of entrepreneurs and the stultification of capital. The experimental knowledge that informs and refines the process of economic growth is stifled, and the metaphysical capital in the system collapses, even while all the indices of capital formation rise.

Source:
Gilder, George. The Spirit of Enterprise. 1 ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.

Steuben Saw “The Genius of this Nation”

“German soldier of fortune and American ally Baron von Steuben (1730-94)” Source of caption and photo: online version of the WSJ review quoted and cited below.

(p. W9) The essence of Steuben’s achievement was his modification of the brutal, robotic precision of the Prussian system to fit American conditions. He was able to do this because he was one of the first foreign observers, military or civilian, to grasp an essential strain of the American character. “The genius of this nation,” he wrote a European friend, “is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians or French. You say to your soldier, ‘Do this,’ and he doeth it. I am obliged to say, ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that,’ and then he does it.”
. . .
While Mr. Lockhart tends to soft-pedal some of Steuben’s more dubious deeds — ignoring, for instance, his attempt to interest Prince Henry of Prussia, Frederick the Great’s younger brother, in becoming king of the independent colonies before the adoption of the Constitution — the author generally treats his subject with balance, understanding and great good humor, aptly concluding that, “although he blurred a few details of the past in order to seek preferment in the United States, somewhere between his arrival and the achievement of American independence, the Baron became something very much like the man he had pretended to be.”

For the full review, see:
ARAM BAKSHIAN JR. “BOOKS; Revolutionary Scamp.” The Wall Street Journal (Sat., NOVEMBER 8, 2008): W9.
The reference to the book under review is:
Lockhart, Paul. The Drillmaster of Valley Forge. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2008.

Source of book image: http://robertos-book-picks.blogspot.com/2008/11/drillmaster-of-valley-forge-baron-de.html

FDR’s 1935 Revival Prediction Proved False

(p. C1) Despite the reputation of the New Deal, deep government interventions are unpredictable and sometimes harmful, reminds Amity Shlaes, who wrote a popular history of the Depression, “The Forgotten Man.”

Ms. Shlaes points to the period of 1936 and 1937, when the Federal Reserve used New Deal laws to tighten reserve requirements on the nation’s banks. The goal was to make the banks stronger, but the result was that banks tightened still further. That cut off credit to the economy at a sensitive period. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell by more than a third between August 1937 and January 1938. Unemployment surged. It was the “depression within the Depression.”
It wasn’t the revival that FDR had predicted back in 1935, when he boasted: “Never since my inauguration in March 1933, have I felt so unmistakably the atmosphere of recovery.”
. . .
“When you’re in the expert business, after a while you realize there are no experts,” says Richard Sylla, New York University’s Henry Kaufman Professor of The History of Financial Institutions and Markets.
The important thing to know, it seems, is how little we know.

For the full commentary, see:
DENNIS K. BERMAN. “THE GAME; Tomorrow’s Recession Recovery Is Today’s History Lesson.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., MARCH 3, 2009): C1.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

The reference to the excellent Shlaes book, is:
Shlaes, Amity. The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression. New York: HarperCollins, 2007.

Gilder Explored “The Spirit of Enterprise”

Source of book image:
http://g-ecx.images-amazon.com/images/G/01/ciu/64/17/bc94225b9da0b4326fb8b010.L.jpg

Gilder presents many case studies of entrepreneurs, with plenty of thought-provoking commentary and generalization.
I read the 1984 version because it is the version that is available in audio that can be listened to while walking the dachshund. I also own the 1992 updated version, and can say from a flip-through that this it is a major revision (not just a “revision” that consists of a new introduction, as is often done).
Gilder justly, and eloquently, takes economists to task for generally ignoring the role of the entrepreneur in improving our lives.

For the early edition, see:
Gilder, George. The Spirit of Enterprise. 1 ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
For the revised version, see:
Gilder, George. Recapturing the Spirit of Enterprise: Updated for the 1990s. updated ed. New York: ICS Press, 1992.

Source of the book image: http://www.icspress.com/images/recapturing.jpg

“Venturesome” Consumers May Help Save the Day

Bhidé makes thought-provoking comments about the role of the entrepreneurial or “venturesome” consumer in the process of innovation. The point is the mirror image on one made by Schumpeter in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy when he emphasized that consumer resistance to innovation is one of the obstacles that entrepreneurs in earlier periods had to overcome. (The decline of such consumer resistance was one of the reasons that Schumpeter speculated that the entrepreneur might become obsolete.)
I would like to see Bhidé’s evidence on his claim that technology rapidly advanced during the Great Depression. The claim seems at odds with Amity Shlaes’ claim that New Deal policies often discouraged entrepreneurship.

(p. A15) Consumers get no respect — we value thrift and deplore the spending that supposedly undermines the investment necessary for our long-run prosperity. In fact, the venturesomeness of consumers has nourished unimaginable advances in our standard of living and created invaluable human capital that is often ignored.
Economists regard the innovations that sustain long-run prosperity as a gift to consumers. Stanford University and Hoover Institution economist Paul Romer wrote in the “Concise Encyclopedia of Economics” in 2007: “In 1985, I paid a thousand dollars per million transistors for memory in my computer. In 2005, I paid less than ten dollars per million, and yet I did nothing to deserve or help pay for this windfall.”
In fact, Mr. Romer and innumerable consumers of transistor-based products such as personal computers have played a critical, “venturesome” role in generating their windfalls.
. . .
History suggests that Americans don’t shirk from venturesome consumption in hard times. The personal computer took off in the dark days of the early 1980s. I paid more than a fourth of my annual income to buy an IBM XT then — as did millions of others. Similarly, in spite of the Great Depression, the rapid increase in the use of new technologies made the 1930s a period of exceptional productivity growth. Today, sales of Apple’s iPhone continue to expand at double-digit rates. Low-income groups (in the $25,000 to $49,999 income segment) are showing the most rapid growth, with resourceful buyers using the latest models as their primary device for accessing the Internet.
Recessions will come and go, but unless we completely mess things up, we can count on our venturesome consumers to keep prosperity on its long, upward arc.

For the full commentary, see:
Amar Bhidé. “Consumers Can Still Spot Value in a Crisis.” Wall Street Journal (Thurs., MARCH 11, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Pay and Profits at Finance Firms Became “Divorced from Actual Economic Activity”

Source of graphs: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. 3) Nonetheless, a significant portion of the finance boom also seems to have been unrelated to economic performance and thus unsustainable. Benjamin M. Friedman, author of “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth,” recalled that when he worked at Morgan Stanley in the early 1970s, the firm’s annual reports were filled with photographs of factories and other tangible businesses. More recently, Wall Street’s annual reports tend to highlight not the businesses that firms were advising so much as finance for the sake of finance, showing upward-sloping graphs and photographs of traders.

“I have the sense that in many of these firms,” Mr. Friedman said, “the activity has become further and further divorced from actual economic activity.”
Which might serve as a summary of how the current crisis came to pass. Wall Street traders began to believe that the values they had assigned to all sorts of assets were rational because, well, they had assigned them.

For the full story, see:
PETER S. GOODMAN. “Debt Sweat; Printing Money and Its Price.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., December 28, 2008): 1 & 4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Benjamin Friedman’s book is:
Friedman, Benjamin M. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York: Knopf, 2005.

Barro Estimates 20% Chance of Depression

Robert Barro is a Harvard economist who specializes in issues of macroeconomics and economic growth.

(p. A15) The U.S. macroeconomy has been so tame for so long that it’s impossible to get an accurate reading about depression odds just from the U.S. data. My approach uses long-term data for many countries and takes into account the historical linkages between depressions and stock-market crashes. (The research is described in “Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions,” a working paper Jose Ursua and I wrote for the National Bureau of Economic Research last month.)

The bottom line is that there is ample reason to worry about slipping into a depression. There is a roughly one-in-five chance that U.S. GDP and consumption will fall by 10% or more, something not seen since the early 1930s.
. . .
In the end, we learned two things. Periods without stock-market crashes are very safe, in the sense that depressions are extremely unlikely. However, periods experiencing stock-market crashes, such as 2008-09 in the U.S., represent a serious threat. The odds are roughly one-in-five that the current recession will snowball into the macroeconomic decline of 10% or more that is the hallmark of a depression.

The bright side of a 20% depression probability is the 80% chance of avoiding a depression. The U.S. had stock-market crashes in 2000-02 (by 42%) and 1973-74 (49%) and, in each case, experienced only mild recessions. Hence, if we are lucky, the current downturn will also be moderate, though likely worse than the other U.S. post-World War II recessions, including 1982.
. . .
Given our situation, it is right that radical government policies should be considered if they promise to lower the probability and likely size of a depression. However, many governmental actions — including several pursued by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression — can make things worse.

I wish I could be confident that the array of U.S. policies already in place and those likely forthcoming will be helpful. But I think it more likely that the economy will eventually recover despite these policies, rather than because of them.

For the full commentary, see:
ROBERT J. BARRO. “What Are the Odds of a Depression?” Wall Street Journal (Weds., MARCH 4, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Barro’s co-authored textbook on economic growth is:
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. 2nd ed: The MIT Press, 2003.

Bailouts Reduce Resources Left for Entrepreneurs

Columbia University Professor Amar Bhidé has authored two important books on entrepreneurship. Some of his thoughts on the current economic crisis follow:

(p. A15) Our ignorance of what causes economic ailments — and how to treat them — is profound. Downturns and financial crises are not regular occurrences, and because economies are always evolving, they tend to be idiosyncratic, singular events.

After decades of diligent research, scholars still argue about what caused the Great Depression — excessive consumption, investment, stock-market speculation and borrowing in the Roaring ’20s, Smoot-Hawley protectionism, or excessively tight monetary policy? Nor do we know how we got out of it: Some credit the New Deal while others say that that FDR’s policies prolonged the Depression.
. . .
Large increases in public spending usurp precious resources from supporting the innovations necessary for our long-term prosperity. Everyone isn’t a pessimist in hard times: The optimism of many entrepreneurs and consumers fueled the takeoff of personal computers during the deep recession of the early 1980s. Amazon has just launched the Kindle 2; its (equally pricey) predecessor sold out last November amid the Wall Street meltdown. But competing with expanded public spending makes it harder for innovations like the personal computer and the Kindle to secure the resources they need.

Hastily enacted programs jeopardize crucial beliefs in the value of productive enterprise. Americans are unusually idealistic and optimistic. We believe that we can all get ahead through innovations because the game isn’t stacked in favor of the powerful. This belief encourages the pursuit of initiatives that contribute to the common good rather than the pursuit of favors and rents. It also discourages the politics of envy. We are less prone to begrudge our neighbors’ fortune if we think it was fairly earned and that it has not come at our expense — indeed, that we too have derived some benefit.

To sustain these beliefs, Americans must see their government play the role of an even-handed referee rather than be a dispenser of rewards or even a judge of economic merit or contribution. The panicky response to the financial crisis, where openness and due process have been sacrificed to speed, has unfortunately undermined our faith. Bailing out AIG while letting Lehman fail — behind closed doors — has raised suspicions of cronyism. The Fed has refused to reveal to whom it has lent trillions. Outrage at the perceived use of TARP funds to pay bonuses is widespread.

For the full commentary, see:

Amar Bhidé. “Don’t Believe the Stimulus Scaremongers.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., FEBRUARY 17, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Bhidé’s two books on entrepreneurship are:
Bhidé, Amar. The Origin and Evolution of New Business. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bhidé, Amar. The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.

“Firms that Made Wrong Decisions Should Fail”

Anna J. Schwartz.

Source of image: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. A11) Most people now living have never seen a credit crunch like the one we are currently enduring. Ms. Schwartz, 92 years old, is one of the exceptions. She’s not only old enough to remember the period from 1929 to 1933, she may know more about monetary history and banking than anyone alive. She co-authored, with Milton Friedman, “A Monetary History of the United States” (1963). It’s the definitive account of how misguided monetary policy turned the stock-market crash of 1929 into the Great Depression.
. . .
These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. “They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down.”
Rather, “firms that made wrong decisions should fail,” she says bluntly. “You shouldn’t rescue them. And once that’s established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich.” The trouble is, “that’s not the way the world has been going in recent years.”
Instead, we’ve been hearing for most of the past year about “systemic risk” — the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake.
Ms. Schwartz doesn’t buy it. “It’s very easy when you’re a market participant,” she notes with a smile, “to claim that you shouldn’t shut down a firm that’s in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that’s their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves. The [government] doesn’t have to save them, just as it didn’t save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what’s been going on.”

For the full story, see:
BRIAN M. CARNEY. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Anna Schwartz; Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., OCTOBER 18, 2008): A10.
(Note: ellipsis added.)