“Ill-Conceived Regulation Poisoned the System”

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Source of formula title and of formula: online version of the WSJ commentary quoted and cited below.

(p. A17) Here’s how ill-conceived regulation poisoned the system. Until recently, bank CEOs and regulators slept well at night thanks to a financial model developed in the 1990s called “value at risk” or VaR. It assesses historical variances and covariances among different securities, informing financial institutions of the risks they’re taking. By assessing risk factors across all securities, VaR can compare historical levels of risk for given portfolios, usually up to a 99% probability that banks would not lose more than a certain amount of money. In normal times, banks compare the VaR worst case with their capital to make sure their reserves can cover losses.

But VaR can’t account for extreme unprecedented events — the collapse of Barings in 1995 due to a rogue trader in Singapore, or today’s government-mandated bad mortgages bundled into securities that are hard to value and unwind. The “1% likely” happened. And because the 1% literally didn’t compute, there was no estimate of the stunning losses that have occurred.
Yale mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot pointed out the shortcomings of the VaR model in his “The (Mis)behavior of Markets,” published in 2004. He noted that bell curves work for, say, disparities in the height of people. In markets, instead of flat tails of rare events at either end of the bell curve, there are “fat tails” of huge upsides and huge downsides. Markets are more complex than the neat shape of bell curves.
Last year’s bestselling nonfiction book had a similar theme. In “The Black Swan,” former trader Nassim Nicholas Taleb pointed out that extreme outcomes are actually common, warning that financial engineers — “scientists,” as he calls them — ignore these unlikely outcomes at their peril. But today’s credit panic was not entirely unpredictable. Mr. Taleb was prescient in writing, “The government-sponsored institution Fannie Mae, when I look at their risks, seems to be sitting on a barrel of dynamite, vulnerable to the slightest hiccup. But not to worry: Their large staffs of scientists deemed these events ‘unlikely.'”

For the full commentary, see:
L. GORDON CROVITZ. “The 1% Panic.” The Wall Street Journal (Mon., OCTOBER 13, 2008): A17.
(Note: the online version of the article had the following added subtitle: “Our financial models were only meant to work 99% of the time.”)

For the Taleb book mentioned in the commentary, see:
Taleb, Nassim Nicholas. The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House, 2007.

For an insightful review of the Taleb book, see:
Diamond, Arthur M., Jr. “Review of the Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable.” Journal of Scientific Exploration 22, no. 3 (2008): 419-22.

“Nebraskans Preparing for the Imminent Arrival of Several Million New York Refugees”

(p. 12) HOUSING prices are falling on both coasts, and bubble panic is around the corner.  The financial magazines are already grabbing their readers by the throat and taunting them with headlines like:  ”U.S. Housing Crash Continues!” ”Where Will Housing Prices Fall the Most?” ”Is It Time to Cash Out?”

What if it is time to cash out?  Where do you go?  If you sell on either coast, then you need to find real estate somewhere that the housing bubble missed.  Guam?  American Samoa?  Wait, how about eastern Nebraska?  Downright frothless when it comes to housing:  the median home price here usually chugs along at the annual rate of inflation and never goes down (up 4 percent last year, up 22 percent over the last five years).

Before you recoil in horror at the thought of living in Omaha, a city of 414,000 souls, consider that this year Money magazine ranked it seventh of the nation’s 10 best big cities to live in, ahead of New York City, which ranked 10th.  O.K., now you may recoil in horror.

These compelling statistics have Nebraskans preparing for the imminent arrival of several million New York refugees (victims of post-traumatic bubble anxiety disorder), who will need emergency real estate and housing triage services.

 

For the full commentary, see:

Richard Dooling.  "Sweet Home Omaha."  The New York Times, Section 4 (Sunday, October 29, 2006):  12.

Nazi Economy Was Not Efficient

A common view of National Socialism is that it was evil, but efficient. A recent book by Richard J. Evans challenges the “efficient” part of the common view. Here is a relevant paragraph from a useful review of Evans’ book:

(p. B5) The Nazi machine, as Mr. Evans describes it, moved forward with a good deal of creaking and squeaking. The economy was no exception. On many fronts, the Nazis managed nothing more than to bring the economy back to the status quo that existed before the Depression. As late as January 1935, one estimate put the number of unemployed at more than four million, and food shortages were still a problem in 1939. Workers put in longer hours simply to stay even.

For the full review, see:
WILLIAM GRIMES. “The Radical Restructuring of a Germany Headed to War.” The New York Times (Weds., October 26, 2005): B8.

The reference to the book is:
Richard J. Evans. The Third Reich in Power: 1933-1939. The Penguin Press, 2005.