Art Diamond's web log
(p. A23) . . . even if fundamental health care reform brings costs under control, I at least find it hard to see how the federal government can meet its long-term obligations without some tax increases on the middle class. Whatever politicians may say now, there’s probably a value-added tax in our future.
For the full commentary, see:
PAUL KRUGMAN. “Climate of Change.” The New York Times (Fri., February 27, 2009): A23.
Printing press for $20 bills. Source of photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.
(p. 4) “We got into this mess to a considerable extent by overborrowing,” said Martin N. Baily, a chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton and now a fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Now, we’re saying, ‘Well, O.K., let’s just borrow a bunch more, and that will help us get out of this mess.’ It’s like a drunk who says, ‘Give me a bottle of Scotch, and then I’ll be O.K. and I won’t have to drink anymore.’ Eventually, we have to get off this binge of borrowing.”
“This is a dangerous situation,” says Mr. Baily, essentially arguing that the drunk must be kept in Scotch a while longer, lest he burn down the neighborhood in the midst of a crisis. “The risks of things actually getting worse and us going into a really severe recession are high. We need to get more money out there now.”
. . .
The most frequently voiced worry about the bailouts is that the Fed, by sending so much money sloshing through the system, risks generating a bad case of rising prices later on. That puts the onus on the Fed to reverse course and crimp economic activity by lifting interest rates and selling assets back to banks once growth resumes.
But finding the appropriate point to act tends to be more art than science. The Fed might move too early and send the economy back into a tailspin. It might wait too long and let too much money generate inflation.
“It’s a tricky business,” says Allan H. Meltzer, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University, and a former economic adviser to President Reagan. “There’s no math model that tells us when to do it or how.”
For the full story, see:
PETER S. GOODMAN. “Debt Sweat; Printing Money and Its Price.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., December 28, 2008): 1 & 4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Source of graph: online version of the NYT commentary quoted and cited below.
(p. B1) It’s hard to exaggerate how scattershot the current system is. Government agencies usually don’t even have to do a rigorous analysis of a project or how it would affect traffic and the environment, relative to its cost and to the alternatives — before deciding whether to proceed. In one recent survey of local officials, almost 80 percent said they had based their decisions largely on politics, while fewer than 20 percent cited a project’s potential (p. B6) benefits.
There are monuments to the resulting waste all over the country: the little-traveled Bud Shuster Highway in western Pennsylvania; new highways in suburban St. Louis and suburban Maryland that won’t alleviate traffic; all the fancy government-subsidized sports stadiums that have replaced perfectly good existing stadiums. These are the Bridges to (Almost) Nowhere that actually got built.
For the full commentary, see:
DAVID LEONHARDT. “Economic Scene; Piling Up Monuments of Waste.” The New York Times (Weds., November 18, 2008): B1 & B6.
Anna J. Schwartz.
Source of image: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.
(p. A11) Most people now living have never seen a credit crunch like the one we are currently enduring. Ms. Schwartz, 92 years old, is one of the exceptions. She’s not only old enough to remember the period from 1929 to 1933, she may know more about monetary history and banking than anyone alive. She co-authored, with Milton Friedman, “A Monetary History of the United States” (1963). It’s the definitive account of how misguided monetary policy turned the stock-market crash of 1929 into the Great Depression.
. . .
These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. “They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down.”
Rather, “firms that made wrong decisions should fail,” she says bluntly. “You shouldn’t rescue them. And once that’s established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich.” The trouble is, “that’s not the way the world has been going in recent years.”
Instead, we’ve been hearing for most of the past year about “systemic risk” — the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake.
Ms. Schwartz doesn’t buy it. “It’s very easy when you’re a market participant,” she notes with a smile, “to claim that you shouldn’t shut down a firm that’s in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that’s their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves. The [government] doesn’t have to save them, just as it didn’t save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what’s been going on.”
For the full story, see:
BRIAN M. CARNEY. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Anna Schwartz; Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., OCTOBER 18, 2008): A10.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
Source of portrait: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henry_Morgenthau,_Jr.
Henry Morgenthau, Jr. was FDR’s Secretary of the Treasury from 1934-1945. In the following important quote, he admits that the big New Deal stimulus spending programs had failed.
(p. 2) We have tried spending money. We are spending more money than we have ever spent before and it does not work. And I have just none interest, and if I am wrong . . . somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country prosperous. I want to see people get a job, I want to see people get enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises. . . . I say after eight years of this administration we have just as much unemployment as when we started . . . . And an enormous debt to boot!
Source:
Folsom, Burton W., Jr. In New Deal or Raw Deal? How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America. 4th ed. New York: Threshold Editions, 2008.
(Note: ellipses in Folsum’s version of the quotation.)
Folsum says that this statement was from testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee in May 1939; and can be found in Morgenthau’s Diary entry for May 9, 1939 at the Roosevelt Presidential Library.
Source of book image: http://www.flickr.com/photos/roscoe/3121498653/
Source of graphs: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.
(p. A10) In the end, say economists, it was not public works but an expensive cleanup of the debt-ridden banking system, combined with growing exports to China and the United States, that brought a close to Japan’s Lost Decade. This has led many to conclude that spending did little more than sink Japan deeply into debt, leaving an enormous tax burden for future generations.
In the United States, it has also led to calls in Congress, particularly by Republicans, not to repeat the errors of Japan’s failed economic stimulus. They argue that it makes more sense to cut taxes, and let people decide how to spend their own money, than for the government to decide how to invest public funds. Japan put more emphasis on increased spending than tax cuts during its slump, but ultimately did reduce consumption taxes to encourage consumer spending as well.
For the full story, see:
MARTIN FACKLER. “Japan’s Big-Works Stimulus Is Lesson.” The New York Times (Fri., February 5, 2009): A1 & A10.
“The soaring Marine Bridge in Hamada, Japan, built as a public works project, was almost devoid of traffic on a recent morning.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.
(p. A16) An analysis of President-elect Barack Obama’s campaign fund-raising punctures one of the most enduring pieces of conventional wisdom from his presidential run: that small donors powered his record-breaking money machine.
. . .
The institute found that while nearly half of Mr. Obama’s donations came in individual contributions of $200 or less, in reality, only 26 percent of the money he collected through Aug. 31 during the primary and 24 percent of his money through Oct. 15 came from contributors whose total donations added up to $200 or less. The data is the most recent available.
For the whole story, see:
MICHAEL LUO. “FUND-RAISING; The Myth of the Small Donor.” The New York Times (Tues., November 25, 2008): A16.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Source of book image: http://ecx.images-amazon.com/images/I/41gD4n5UkHL._SL500_.jpg
Niall Ferguson has a recent book on money that has received a great deal of attention (but that I have not yet seen). Here are some of his views, as expressed at the 2009 World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland:
(p. B4) “Even before Obama walked through the White House door, there were plans for $1 trillion of new debt,” said Niall Ferguson, a Harvard historian who has studied borrowing and its impact on national power. He now estimates that some $2.2 trillion in new government debt will be issued this year, assuming the stimulus plan is approved.
“You either crowd out other borrowers or you print money,” Mr. Ferguson added. “There is no way you can have $2.2 trillion in borrowing without influencing interest rates or inflation in the long-term.”
Mr. Ferguson was particularly struck by the new borrowing because the roots of the current crisis lay in an excess of American debt at all levels, from homeowners to Wall Street banks.
“This is a crisis of excessive debt, which reached 355 percent of American gross domestic product,” he said. “It cannot be solved with more debt.”
While Mr. Ferguson is a skeptic of the Keynesian thinking behind President Obama’s plan — rather than borrowing and spending to stimulate the economy, he favors corporate tax cuts — even supporters of the plan like Mr. Zedillo and Stephen Roach of Morgan Stanley have called on the White House to quickly address how it will pay for the spending in the long-term.
For the full story, see:
NELSON D. SCHWARTZ. “Global Worries Over U.S. Stimulus Spending.” The New York Times (Fri., January 29, 2009): B1 & B4.
The latest Ferguson book, is:
Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World. New York: Penguin Press, 2008.
(p. A2) Rep. Paul Ryan of Wisconsin, a young and economically astute Republican leader, has numerous problems with the economic-stimulus package working its way through Congress, but essentially they boil down to this: He fears the U.S. is repeating the mistakes Japan made trying to get out of its own economic ditch in the 1990s.
The Ryan critique is important in part because it’s popping up with increasing frequency among congressional Republicans.
. . .
Here’s the critique in a nutshell: Japan in the early 1990s, like the U.S. today, saw a real-estate bubble burst, spawning a banking and credit crisis that drove the whole economy down, hard. The Japanese then tried stimulating the economy with giant doses of government spending, which didn’t pep things up — but did bring on deficits that required tax increases later, dragging out Japan’s problems for years.
For the full commentary, see:
GERALD F. SEIB. “CAPITAL JOURNAL; Avoiding Japan’s Stimulus Miscues.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., FEBRUARY 2, 2009): A2.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Source of graphic: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.
(p. 9) Who’s to blame for the implosion of financial markets? The finger-pointing has gone in every direction, and it’s easy to see why: the regulatory structure points in every direction.
The apparatus that oversees the nation’s financial system is an ad hoc creation: every time there is a fiscal panic, new agencies are formed and existing ones receive new responsibilities.
For the full comment, see:
HANNAH FAIRFIELD. “Metrics; A Snarl of Regulation.” The New York Times, SundayBusiness Section (Sun., October 4, 2008): 9.