Art Diamond's web log
(p. A23) . . . even if fundamental health care reform brings costs under control, I at least find it hard to see how the federal government can meet its long-term obligations without some tax increases on the middle class. Whatever politicians may say now, there’s probably a value-added tax in our future.
For the full commentary, see:
PAUL KRUGMAN. “Climate of Change.” The New York Times (Fri., February 27, 2009): A23.
Source of the graphic: screen capture from the online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.
(p. A1) Much of the world may be struggling with the economic downturn, but life has been getting better in Columbus, Ind., Kingsport, Tenn., and Waterloo, Iowa.
These out-of-the-way places have become trade hot spots as U.S. exports, fueled by the dollar’s fall, continue to provide a rare spark in an otherwise gloomy economy.
While many economists expect a recent snapback in the value of the dollar and a spreading global slowdown to soften that growth, exports have become a key to greater local prosperity more than at any time in decades.
. . .
(p. A16) Export-driven growth marks a dramatic shift in an economy that has relied heavily on consumer spending. That has slowed in recent months as Americans, nervous about job losses, teetering banks, falling home values, and rising gasoline and food prices, have tightened spending. Against that background, exports have emerged as a powerful motor.
Over the past year, real-goods exports have risen $115 billion, or 12%, and are up across every major category. They now make up nearly 13.5% of gross domestic product, the highest percentage since World War II. Critics often grumble that the U.S. exports masses of scrap steel and other waste materials to recyclers in China and elsewhere, which is true, but exports of manufactured goods, commodities and services are also growing. Consumer products, from sporting goods to art supplies, have risen 12%, and even autos, which are languishing on showroom floors in the U.S., saw a 4% bump up in exports.
Service exports — which include media, entertainment, financial services, computer software and foreign tourism in the U.S. — have grown strongly right along with the larger goods side of the trade ledger. Through the second quarter of 2008, real-service exports are up nearly 10% over the past year.
It’s a badly needed tonic for the beleaguered U.S. economy.
For the full story, see:
TIMOTHY AEPPEL. “Exports Bolster Local Economies.” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., SEPTEMBER 11, 2008): A1 & A16.
(Note: the title of the article on the web is: “Exports Prop Up Local Economies.”)
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(p. A15) The passage of the $787 billion stimulus bill has so far failed to stimulate anything but greater market pessimism. This suggests to us that the strategy behind the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act is wrong — and worse, that the weapons it is using to fight the recession are obsolete.
Just as generals are notorious for fighting the last war, Congress and the White House seem intent on fixing an economy of hidebound and obsolete companies and industries, while ignoring the innovative ones rising before us and those waiting to be born.
Missing from this legislation is anything more than token support for the long-proven source of most new jobs and new growth in America: entrepreneurs. These are the people who gave us everything — from Wal-Mart to iPhones, from microprocessors to Twitter — that is still strong in our economy. Without entrepreneurs, we will never get out of our current predicament.
For the full commentary, see:
TOM HAYES and MICHAEL S. MALONE. “Entrepreneurs Can Lead Us Out of the Crisis What Are the Odds of a Depression?” Wall Street Journal (Tues., FEBRUARY 24, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)
Source of graphs: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.
(p. 3) Nonetheless, a significant portion of the finance boom also seems to have been unrelated to economic performance and thus unsustainable. Benjamin M. Friedman, author of “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth,” recalled that when he worked at Morgan Stanley in the early 1970s, the firm’s annual reports were filled with photographs of factories and other tangible businesses. More recently, Wall Street’s annual reports tend to highlight not the businesses that firms were advising so much as finance for the sake of finance, showing upward-sloping graphs and photographs of traders.
“I have the sense that in many of these firms,” Mr. Friedman said, “the activity has become further and further divorced from actual economic activity.”
Which might serve as a summary of how the current crisis came to pass. Wall Street traders began to believe that the values they had assigned to all sorts of assets were rational because, well, they had assigned them.
For the full story, see:
PETER S. GOODMAN. “Debt Sweat; Printing Money and Its Price.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., December 28, 2008): 1 & 4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Benjamin Friedman’s book is:
Friedman, Benjamin M. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York: Knopf, 2005.
Robert Barro is a Harvard economist who specializes in issues of macroeconomics and economic growth.
(p. A15) The U.S. macroeconomy has been so tame for so long that it’s impossible to get an accurate reading about depression odds just from the U.S. data. My approach uses long-term data for many countries and takes into account the historical linkages between depressions and stock-market crashes. (The research is described in “Stock-Market Crashes and Depressions,” a working paper Jose Ursua and I wrote for the National Bureau of Economic Research last month.)
The bottom line is that there is ample reason to worry about slipping into a depression. There is a roughly one-in-five chance that U.S. GDP and consumption will fall by 10% or more, something not seen since the early 1930s.
. . .
In the end, we learned two things. Periods without stock-market crashes are very safe, in the sense that depressions are extremely unlikely. However, periods experiencing stock-market crashes, such as 2008-09 in the U.S., represent a serious threat. The odds are roughly one-in-five that the current recession will snowball into the macroeconomic decline of 10% or more that is the hallmark of a depression.The bright side of a 20% depression probability is the 80% chance of avoiding a depression. The U.S. had stock-market crashes in 2000-02 (by 42%) and 1973-74 (49%) and, in each case, experienced only mild recessions. Hence, if we are lucky, the current downturn will also be moderate, though likely worse than the other U.S. post-World War II recessions, including 1982.
. . .
Given our situation, it is right that radical government policies should be considered if they promise to lower the probability and likely size of a depression. However, many governmental actions — including several pursued by Franklin Roosevelt during the Great Depression — can make things worse.I wish I could be confident that the array of U.S. policies already in place and those likely forthcoming will be helpful. But I think it more likely that the economy will eventually recover despite these policies, rather than because of them.
For the full commentary, see:
ROBERT J. BARRO. “What Are the Odds of a Depression?” Wall Street Journal (Weds., MARCH 4, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipses added.)
Barro’s co-authored textbook on economic growth is:
Barro, Robert J., and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. Economic Growth. 2nd ed: The MIT Press, 2003.
Printing press for $20 bills. Source of photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.
(p. 4) “We got into this mess to a considerable extent by overborrowing,” said Martin N. Baily, a chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Clinton and now a fellow at the Brookings Institution. “Now, we’re saying, ‘Well, O.K., let’s just borrow a bunch more, and that will help us get out of this mess.’ It’s like a drunk who says, ‘Give me a bottle of Scotch, and then I’ll be O.K. and I won’t have to drink anymore.’ Eventually, we have to get off this binge of borrowing.”
“This is a dangerous situation,” says Mr. Baily, essentially arguing that the drunk must be kept in Scotch a while longer, lest he burn down the neighborhood in the midst of a crisis. “The risks of things actually getting worse and us going into a really severe recession are high. We need to get more money out there now.”
. . .
The most frequently voiced worry about the bailouts is that the Fed, by sending so much money sloshing through the system, risks generating a bad case of rising prices later on. That puts the onus on the Fed to reverse course and crimp economic activity by lifting interest rates and selling assets back to banks once growth resumes.
But finding the appropriate point to act tends to be more art than science. The Fed might move too early and send the economy back into a tailspin. It might wait too long and let too much money generate inflation.
“It’s a tricky business,” says Allan H. Meltzer, an economist at Carnegie Mellon University, and a former economic adviser to President Reagan. “There’s no math model that tells us when to do it or how.”
For the full story, see:
PETER S. GOODMAN. “Debt Sweat; Printing Money and Its Price.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., December 28, 2008): 1 & 4.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Columbia University Professor Amar Bhidé has authored two important books on entrepreneurship. Some of his thoughts on the current economic crisis follow:
(p. A15) Our ignorance of what causes economic ailments — and how to treat them — is profound. Downturns and financial crises are not regular occurrences, and because economies are always evolving, they tend to be idiosyncratic, singular events.
After decades of diligent research, scholars still argue about what caused the Great Depression — excessive consumption, investment, stock-market speculation and borrowing in the Roaring ’20s, Smoot-Hawley protectionism, or excessively tight monetary policy? Nor do we know how we got out of it: Some credit the New Deal while others say that that FDR’s policies prolonged the Depression.
. . .
Large increases in public spending usurp precious resources from supporting the innovations necessary for our long-term prosperity. Everyone isn’t a pessimist in hard times: The optimism of many entrepreneurs and consumers fueled the takeoff of personal computers during the deep recession of the early 1980s. Amazon has just launched the Kindle 2; its (equally pricey) predecessor sold out last November amid the Wall Street meltdown. But competing with expanded public spending makes it harder for innovations like the personal computer and the Kindle to secure the resources they need.Hastily enacted programs jeopardize crucial beliefs in the value of productive enterprise. Americans are unusually idealistic and optimistic. We believe that we can all get ahead through innovations because the game isn’t stacked in favor of the powerful. This belief encourages the pursuit of initiatives that contribute to the common good rather than the pursuit of favors and rents. It also discourages the politics of envy. We are less prone to begrudge our neighbors’ fortune if we think it was fairly earned and that it has not come at our expense — indeed, that we too have derived some benefit.
To sustain these beliefs, Americans must see their government play the role of an even-handed referee rather than be a dispenser of rewards or even a judge of economic merit or contribution. The panicky response to the financial crisis, where openness and due process have been sacrificed to speed, has unfortunately undermined our faith. Bailing out AIG while letting Lehman fail — behind closed doors — has raised suspicions of cronyism. The Fed has refused to reveal to whom it has lent trillions. Outrage at the perceived use of TARP funds to pay bonuses is widespread.
For the full commentary, see:
Amar Bhidé. “Don’t Believe the Stimulus Scaremongers.” Wall Street Journal (Tues., FEBRUARY 17, 2009): A15.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
Bhidé’s two books on entrepreneurship are:
Bhidé, Amar. The Origin and Evolution of New Business. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Bhidé, Amar. The Venturesome Economy: How Innovation Sustains Prosperity in a More Connected World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Irving Fisher is widely viewed as one of the handful ot top United States economists of the 1920s and 1930s. In addition, he focused on topics that today are considered part of macroeconomics. His not forecasting the economic downturn can be given different interpretations. Some, such as Taleb, would attribute it in part to fundamental uncertainty. Until recently, many economists would have said that Fisher still had a lot to learn, but we are now know more than him.
That may be true, but we still have a lot to learn.
(p. 5) IRRATIONAL exuberance? As the nation entered recession in the summer of 1929, there were still plenty of economists, business leaders and politicians who looked to the future with optimism. And why not? The Dow Jones industrial average was soaring. Then the stock market bubble burst on Oct. 24, which led to several days of panicked selling — an opening bell for the worldwide economic collapse that soon followed. Here’s what some leading politicians, economists and business leaders had to say in the months before and after the crash. Sound familiar?
. . .
Irving Fisher, professor of economics at Yale University, in The New York Times, Sept. 6, 1929. He ended up losing much of his wealth in the crash:
“There may be a recession in stock prices, but not anything in the nature of a crash.”
. . .
The Harvard Economic Society, November 1929:
“A severe depression like that of 1920-21 is outside the range of probability. We are not facing protracted liquidation.”
For the full story, see:
“Word For Word; I’m Having a Flashback; A Storm Unforeseen, Always About to Pass.” The New York Times, Week in Review Section (Sun., October 11, 2008): 5.
(Note: no author is listed.)
(Note: ellipses added.)
Source of graph: online version of the NYT commentary quoted and cited below.
(p. B1) It’s hard to exaggerate how scattershot the current system is. Government agencies usually don’t even have to do a rigorous analysis of a project or how it would affect traffic and the environment, relative to its cost and to the alternatives — before deciding whether to proceed. In one recent survey of local officials, almost 80 percent said they had based their decisions largely on politics, while fewer than 20 percent cited a project’s potential (p. B6) benefits.
There are monuments to the resulting waste all over the country: the little-traveled Bud Shuster Highway in western Pennsylvania; new highways in suburban St. Louis and suburban Maryland that won’t alleviate traffic; all the fancy government-subsidized sports stadiums that have replaced perfectly good existing stadiums. These are the Bridges to (Almost) Nowhere that actually got built.
For the full commentary, see:
DAVID LEONHARDT. “Economic Scene; Piling Up Monuments of Waste.” The New York Times (Weds., November 18, 2008): B1 & B6.
Anna J. Schwartz.
Source of image: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.
(p. A11) Most people now living have never seen a credit crunch like the one we are currently enduring. Ms. Schwartz, 92 years old, is one of the exceptions. She’s not only old enough to remember the period from 1929 to 1933, she may know more about monetary history and banking than anyone alive. She co-authored, with Milton Friedman, “A Monetary History of the United States” (1963). It’s the definitive account of how misguided monetary policy turned the stock-market crash of 1929 into the Great Depression.
. . .
These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. “They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down.”
Rather, “firms that made wrong decisions should fail,” she says bluntly. “You shouldn’t rescue them. And once that’s established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich.” The trouble is, “that’s not the way the world has been going in recent years.”
Instead, we’ve been hearing for most of the past year about “systemic risk” — the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake.
Ms. Schwartz doesn’t buy it. “It’s very easy when you’re a market participant,” she notes with a smile, “to claim that you shouldn’t shut down a firm that’s in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that’s their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves. The [government] doesn’t have to save them, just as it didn’t save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what’s been going on.”
For the full story, see:
BRIAN M. CARNEY. “OPINION: THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW with Anna Schwartz; Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., OCTOBER 18, 2008): A10.
(Note: ellipsis added.)