Economic Crisis – Page 8 – artdiamondblog.com

Reinhart Rogoff Result Robust: High Debt Lowers Growth Rate from 3.5 to 2.3 Percent

(p. A29) CAMBRIDGE, Mass. In May 2010, we published an academic paper, “Growth in a Time of Debt.” Its main finding, drawing on data from 44 countries over 200 years, was that in both rich and developing countries, high levels of government debt — specifically, gross public debt equaling 90 percent or more of the nation’s annual economic output — was associated with notably lower rates of growth.
. . .
Last week, three economists at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, released a paper criticizing our findings. They correctly identified a spreadsheet coding error that led us to miscalculate the growth rates of highly indebted countries since World War II. But they also accused us of “serious errors” stemming from “selective exclusion” of relevant data and “unconventional weighting” of statistics — charges that we vehemently dispute.
. . .
Our 2010 paper found that, over the long term, growth is about 1 percentage point lower when debt is 90 percent or more of gross domestic product. The University of Massachusetts researchers do not overturn this fundamental finding, which several researchers have elaborated upon.
. . .
There were just 26 cases where the ratio of debt to G.D.P. exceeded 90 percent for five years or more; the average high-debt spell was 23 years. In 23 of the 26 cases, average growth was slower during the high-debt period than in periods of lower debt levels. Indeed, economies grew at an average annual rate of roughly 3.5 percent, when the ratio was under 90 percent, but at only a 2.3 percent rate, on average, at higher relative debt levels.
. . .
The fact that high-debt episodes last so long suggests that they are not, as some liberal economists contend, simply a matter of downturns in the business cycle.
In “This Time Is Different,” our 2009 history of financial crises over eight centuries, we found that when sovereign debt reached unsustainable levels, so did the cost of borrowing, if it was even possible at all. The current situation confronting Italy and Greece, whose debts date from the early 1990s, long before the 2007-8 global financial crisis, support this view.

For the full commentary, see:
CARMEN M. REINHART and KENNETH S. ROGOFF. “Debt, Growth and the Austerity Debate.” The New York Times (Fri., April 26, 2013): A29.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the commentary has the date April 25, 2013.)

The full reference to the authors’ book is:
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

To Avoid Economic Crises We Need to Look at Evidence from Economic History

(p. 1093) Methodologically, the most fundamental and forceful message from the book is that, by ignoring history and the fact that crises remain frequent, recurrent, episodic events–in both rich and poor countries–almost everyone, including researchers and policymakers, made themselves vulnerable to the wishful thinking encapsulated in the book’s title. There is a deeper statistical point here. Crises, and for that matter large recessions and other phenomena that are of first-order interest given their implications for economic activity, occur at quite a low frequency. They are rare events, meaning that they do not occur so frequently, at least for most countries in a short-span time series. Thus recent experience can be an unfaithful guide for scholars and statesmen alike, a good example being the complacent thinking that accompanied the erstwhile Great Moderation of recent decades even as financial pressures built up nationally and internationally. Possibly the most important lesson that readers will take away from this book is that if we are to do better in future, from our policy thinking in the chambers of power to our macroeconometric analyses in academe, (p. 1094) we need to admit the existence of, and come to grips with, a much broader universe of evidence.

For the full review, see:
Taylor, Alan M. “Global Financial Stability and the Lessons of History: A Review of Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff’s This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.” Journal of Economic Literature 50, no. 4 (Dec. 2012): 1092-105.
(Note: italics in original.)

The book that Taylor reviews, is:
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

Fiscal Stimulus Packages Did Not Stimulate

(p. 686) An empirical review of the three fiscal stimulus packages of the 2000s shows that they had little if any direct impact on consumption or government purchases. Households largely saved the transfers and tax rebates. The federal government only increased purchases by a small amount. State and local governments saved their stimulus grants and shifted spending away from purchases to transfers. Counterfactual simulations show that the stimulus-induced decrease in state and local government purchases was larger than the increase in federal purchases. Simulations also show that a larger stimulus package with the same design as the 2009 stimulus would not have increased government purchases or consumption by a larger amount. These results raise doubts about the efficacy of such packages adding weight to similar assessments reached more than thirty years ago.

Source:
Taylor, John B. “An Empirical Analysis of the Revival of Fiscal Activism in the 2000s.” Journal of Economic Literature 49, no. 3 (September 2011): 686-702.

Governments Use “Financial Repression” to Lower Their Interest Payments on Debt

(p. 229) Carmen M. Reinhart, Jacob F. Kirkegaard, and M. Belen Sbrancia make a case for “Financial Repression Redux: Governments Are Once Again Finding Ways to Manipulate Markets to Hold Down the Cost of Financing Debt.” “Financial repression occurs when governments implement policies to channel to themselves funds that in a deregulated market environment would go elsewhere. . . . One of the main goals of financial repression is to keep nominal interest rates lower than they would be in more competitive markets. Other things equal, this reduces the government’s interest expenses for a given stock of debt and contributes to deficit reduction. (p. 230) However, when financial repression produces negative real interest rates (nominal rates below the inflation rate), it reduces or liquidates existing debts and becomes the equivalent of a tax–a transfer from creditors (savers) to borrowers, including the government . . .” “Financial repression contributed to rapid debt reduction following World War II. . . . It seems probable that policymakers for some time to come will be preoccupied with debt reduction, debt management, and efforts to keep debt servicing costs at a reasonable level. In this setting, financial repression, with its dual aims of keeping interest rates low and creating or maintaining captive domestic audiences, will continue to find renewed favor, and the measures and developments we have described and discussed are likely to be only the tip of a very large iceberg.”

Reinhart et al as quoted in:
Taylor, Timothy. “Recommendations for Further Reading.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 223-30.
(Note: ellipses added by Taylor.)

For the full Reinhart et al paper, see:
Reinhart, Carmen M., Jacob F. Kirkegaard, and M. Belen Sbrancia. “Financial Repression Redux.” Finance and Development 48, no. 2 (June 2011): 22-26.

Economics Should Be in “Broad-Exploration Mode”

(p. 85) What does concern me about my discipline, . . . , is that its current core–by which I mainly mean the so-called dynamic stochastic general equilibrium approach–has become so mesmerized with its own internal logic that it has begun to confuse the precision it has achieved about its own world with the precision that it has about the real one. This is dangerous for both methodological and policy reasons. On the methodology front, macroeconomic research has been in “fine-tuning” mode within the local-maximum of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium world, when we should be in “broad-exploration” mode. We are too far (p. 86) from absolute truth to be so specialized and to make the kind of confident quantitative claims that often emerge from the core. On the policy front, this confused precision creates the illusion that a minor adjustment in the standard policy framework will prevent future crises, and by doing so it leaves us overly exposed to the new and unexpected.
. . .
(p. 100) Going back to our macroeconomic models, we need to spend much more effort in understanding the topology of interactions in real economies. The financial sector and its recent struggles have made this need vividly clear, but this issue is certainly not exclusive to this sector.
The challenges are big, but macroeconomists can no longer continue playing internal games. The alternative of leaving all the important stuff to the “policy”-types (p. 101) and informal commentators cannot be the right approach. I do not have the answer. But I suspect that whatever the solution ultimately is, we will accelerate our convergence to it, and reduce the damage we do along the transition, if we focus on reducing the extent of our pretense-of-knowledge syndrome.

Source:
Caballero, Ricardo J. “Macroeconomics after the Crisis: Time to Deal with the Pretense-of-Knowledge Syndrome.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 85-102.
(Note: ellipses added.)

Solow Testifies on Irrelevance of DSGE Macro Models

In Nobel-prize-winner Robert Solow’s congressional testimony, quoted below, “DSGE” is an abbreviation for “dynamic stochastic general equilibrium.”

(p. 221) Solow argues: “It may be unusual for the Committee to focus on so abstract a question, but it is certainly natural and urgent. Here we are, still near the bottom of a deep and prolonged recession, with the immediate future uncertain, desperately short of jobs, and the approach to macroeconomics that dominates serious thinking, certainly in our elite universities and in many central banks and other influential policy circles, seems to have absolutely nothing to say about the problem. Not only does it (p. 222) offer no guidance or insight, it really seems to have nothing useful to say. . . . Especially when it comes to matters as important as macroeconomics, a mainstream economist like me insists that every proposition must pass the smell test: does this really make sense? I do not think that the currently popular DSGE models pass the smell test.”

Source:
Taylor, Timothy. “Recommendations for Further Reading.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 4 (Fall 2010): 219-26.
(Note: ellipsis in original.)

Progress of Economic Science on Central Banking

The passage below is a comment by former head of the Fed, Paul Volcker.

(p. 25) . . . I recently commented to some of my economist friends that I’m not aware of any large contribution that economic science has made to central banking in the last 50 years or so.

Our ability to forecast is still very limited. The old issues of the relative role of fiscal and monetary policies are still debated. Markets are certainly more complex, and some of the old approaches toward monetary control seem less relevant. Recent events have certainly illustrated limitations in our understanding of the economy.
The advent of floating exchange rates, which partly reflects a shift in academic thinking, has certainly been important, but the underlying problems of policy seem familiar.

Stern, Gary H., interviewer. “Paul A.Volcker in Conversation with Gary H. Stern.” The Region (September 2009): 18-29.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

Business Cycles May Arise from “the Summation of Random Causes,” Rather than from Creative Destruction

The Slutsky result summarized below would seem to imply that you can explain business cycles without fingering creative destruction as the culprit, as Schumpeter had seemed to do. The costs of creative destruction are thus reduced, and the case for creative destruction strengthened.

(p. 232) Phil Davies and Joe Mahon investigate “The Meaning of Slutsky.” “A middleaged professor working at a Moscow think tank, [Eugen] Slutsky was virtually unknown to economists in Europe and the United States when he published his landmark paper on cyclical phenomena in 1927. In a bold statistical experiment, Slutsky demonstrated that random numbers subjected to statistical calculations similar to those used to reveal trends in economic time-series formed wavelike patterns indistinguishable from business cycles. The implication was that a similar stochastic process–‘the summation of random causes,’ as Slutsky described it–might be at work in the actual economy, causing prosperity to ebb and flow without the agency of sunspots, meteorological patterns or other cyclical forces. ‘That was a hell of an idea,’ said Robert Lucas, a University of Chicago economist who pioneered modern business cycle theory, in an interview. ‘It was just a huge jump from what anyone had done.’

Source:
Taylor, Timothy. “Recommendations for Further Reading.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 24, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 227-34.
(Note: bracketed name in original.)

The published version of the article summarized by Taylor is:
Davies, Phil, and Joe Mahon. “The Meaning of Slutsky.” The Region (Dec. 2009): 13-17, 42-46.

Sweden Prospers from Low Taxes, No Stimulus and Fiscal Discipline

Source of graph: online version of the WSJ article quoted and cited below.

(p. A9) STOCKHOLM–Sweden’s economy, bolstered by solid exports and healthy consumer spending, is picking up considerable steam even as many of its European neighbors gasp for breath amid the struggle to contain the euro-zone debt crisis.

Sweden’s second-quarter economic output data, released Monday, significantly outpaced expectations, further solidifying the Northern European country’s reputation as a haven in a volatile period. The Swedish krona, which recently reached a 12-year peak against the euro, strengthened further after the report.
. . .
. . . , Sweden has built a reputation for fiscal discipline since it suffered a financial crisis in the early 1990s. Successive governments have since stuck to a target to post a surplus of 1% of GDP over any business cycle.
Lawmakers resisted the temptation to borrow to fuel growth during the boom of the early 2000s, which meant Sweden hit the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 with strong public finances. The government hasn’t needed to increase taxes in the way Spain has, or to cut spending as in the U.K.

For the full story, see:
CHARLES DUXBURY. “In Crisis, a Rare Swede Spot.” The Wall Street Journal (Tues., July 31, 2012): A9.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the article was dated July 30, 2012.)

“Highly Leveraged Economies, . . . , Seldom Survive”

Source of book image: http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/ED-AK313_book10_DV_20091008170122.jpg

(p. 762) Every once in a while, a work comes along whose key points ought to be part of the information set of every literate economist. Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth S. Rogoff’s This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly is such a work. It describes and analyzes a long international history of several types of financial crises.
. . .
The authors resist giving too much structural interpretation to their analysis. Most would agree with their conclusion that ” . . . highly leveraged economies, particularly those in which continual rollover of short-term debt is sustained only by confidence in relatively illiquid underlying assets, seldom survive” (p. 292).

For the full review, see:
Boskin, Michael J. “Review of: This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly.” Journal of Economic Literature 48, no. 3 (September 2010): 762-66.
(Note: ellipsis internal to the final quotation, and the italics, are in the original; ellipsis between paragraphs is added.)
(Note: the “p. 292” refers to a page in the book, and not a page of the review.)(

The book being reviewed, is:
Reinhart, Carmen M., and Kenneth Rogoff. This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.