Economics – Page 147 – artdiamondblog.com

Higher Unemployment Benefits May Result in Higher Unemployment Rates

The size and structure of the “safety net” is a subject of hot debate. Hayek in The Road to Serfdom suggested that higher benefits would lead to slower labor market adjustments.
There may have been multiple causes for the high unemployment rate in the U.K. in the 1920s and 1930s. But it is highly plausible that higher unemployment benefits would have made the unemployed more selective in which jobs they would accept, and hence would have contributed to higher rates of unemployment and higher average duration of unemployment.

(p. 7B) The ultimate evidence . . . is from the 1920s, when the Labour Party came to power in the U.K. for the first time. As scholars Daniel K. Benjamin and Levis Kochin pointed out in a Journal of Political Economy paper, the moment was one in which “unemployment benefits were on a more generous scale relative to wages than ever before or since.”

The result was the mother of all jobless recoveries. For almost two decades, from 1921 to 1938, U.K. unemployment averaged 14 percent and never got below 9.5 percent.

For the full story, see:
Amity Shlaes. “Help can hurt job hunters.” Omaha World-Herald (Friday April 16, 2010): 7B.
(Note: ellipsis added.)

FDR’s NRA Price-Fixing Helped Big Firms “Ruin” Little Firms

(p. 50) Among those damaged was Carl Pharis, the general manager of Pharis Tire and Rubber Company in Newark, Ohio. Pharis employed over one thousand people, mainly in the Newark area. His company grew because, in Pharis’s words, “we would make the best possible rubber tire and sell it at the lowest price consistent with a modest but safe profit.” He and his employees had survived the grim Great Depression years because they had lower prices, a good tire, and solid support in central Ohio from buyers who knew the company because it was local and because it priced its tires lower than the larger firms. As Pharis said, “It is obvious that they cannot make as good a tire as we make and sell it at the price at which we can sell at a profit:”

Then came the NRA with its high fixed prices for tires. As Pharis said, “Since the industry began to formulate a Code under the N. R. A., in June, 1933, we have at all times opposed any form of price-fixing. We believe it to be illegal and we know it to be oppressive.” He added, “We quite understand that, if we were compelled to sell our tires at exactly the same price as they sell their tires, their great national consumer acceptance would soon capture our purchasers and ruin us. Since we have so little of this consumer publicity when compared with them, our only hope is in our ability (p. 51) to make as good or a better tire than they make and to sell it at a less[er] price. . . . ”
Since Pharis and other small companies were no longer allowed to sell tires at discounted rates, Goodyear and Firestone “could go out just as they have gone out,” Pharis noted, “and say to prospective customers that, since they had to pay the same price, it would be wiser if they bought the nationally advertised lines.”
In a nutshell, Pharis put it this way: “The Government deliberately raised our prices up towards the prices at which the big companies wanted to sell, at which they could make a profit, . . . where more easily, with much less loss, they could come down and ‘get us’ and where, bound by N. R. A. decrees, we could not use lower prices, although we could have lowered them and still made a decent profit.”
Pharis was on the verge of closing down and having to lay off all of his one thousand employees. His company, with its low prices and quality tires, could weather the Great Depression, but not the NRA. “If we were asking favors from the Government,” Pharis concluded, “there would be little justice in our complaints. . . . And so, if the big fellows, with their too-heavy investments and high costs of manufacturing and selling, cannot successfully compete with us little fellows without Government aid, they should quit.”

Source:
Folsom, Burton W., Jr. New Deal or Raw Deal? How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America. New York: Threshold Editions, 2008.
(Note: ellipses in original.)

Government Quotas Raise U.S. Sugar Price from 17 Cents a Pound to 31 Cents a Pound

Every semester in my principles of microeconomics course, I show the students a wonderful old 60 Minutes segment on the U.S. government’s sugar quotas program. I tell them, alas, that the policy is still the same. Below is recent evidence:

(p. C1) . . . , U.S. sugar farmers have successfully blocked efforts to significantly increase imports, assuring them of little price competition.

Restrictions on imports have caused American users to pay much more than the rest of the world for sugar. That gap recently blew out to its widest in a decade.
Mr. Vilsack’s comments raised the prospect of increased demand for global sugar and drove prices up 2.7%, or 0.44 cent, to 16.98 cents a pound on ICE Futures U.S. Prices for U.S. domestic sugar dropped 2.1%, to 30.8 cents a pound. That narrowed the gap between the two to 13.82 cents a pound.

For the full story, see:
CAROLYN CUI and BILL TOMSON , ILAN BRAT. “USDA Says It May Relax Sugar Quotas For This Year.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., APRIL 14, 2010): C1 & C2.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the title of the online version of the article is “USDA Says It May Relax Sugar Quotas.”)

Much of the Value of “Chinese” Imports is Added Outside of China

(p. A17) In a 2006 paper, Stanford University economist Lawrence Lau found that Chinese value-added accounted for about 37% of the total value of U.S. imports from China. In 2008, using a different methodology, U.S. International Trade Commission economist Robert Koopman, along with economists Zhi Wang and Shang-jin Wei, found the figure to be closer to 50%. In other words, despite all the hand-wringing about the value of imports from China, one-half to nearly two thirds of that value is not even Chinese. Instead, it reflects the efforts of workers and capital in other countries, including the U.S. In overstating Chinese value by 100% to 200%, the official U.S. import statistics are a poor proxy for job loss.

Seldom noted in the union-controlled discussion of trade on Capitol Hill is that the jobs of large numbers of American workers depend on imports from China. The proliferation of transnational production and supply chains has joined higher-value-added U.S. manufacturing, design, and R&D activities with lower-value manufacturing and assembly operations in China.
According to a widely cited 2007 study by Greg Linden, Kenneth L. Kraemer and Jason Dedrick of the University of California, Irvine, each Apple iPod costs $150 to produce. But only about $4 of that cost is Chinese value-added. Most of the value comes from components made in other countries, including the U.S. Yet when those iPods are imported from China, where they are snapped together, the full $150 is counted as an import from China, adding to the trade deficit and inflating EPI’s job-loss figures.
In reality, those imported iPods support thousands of U.S. jobs up the value chain–in engineering, design, finance, manufacturing, marketing, distribution, retail and elsewhere. A 25% tariff on imports from China would penalize the non-Chinese companies and workers who create most of the iPod’s value.

For the full commentary, see:
DANIEL IKENSON. “China Trade and American Jobs; Studies suggest that one-half to two-thirds of the value of ‘Chinese’ imports is added in other countries, including the U.S.” The Wall Street Journal (Fri., APRIL 2, 2010): A17.

Folsom Shows How FDR Lied, Bought Votes and Deepened the Depression

Source of book image: http://mises.org/misesreview_detail.aspx?control=347

FDR has never been one of my heroes. But in the last few years, I have read two books that have revealed him to have been much worse than I expected. In earlier posts, I have praised Amity Shlaes’ The Forgotten Man.
Here I praise Burt Folsom’s New Deal or Raw Deal?
Folsom documents how the economic policies of Roosevelt lengthened and deepened the Great Depression.
But what I think I will remember most about the book, is the example after example of how FDR lied to both friend and foe; and the example after example of how FDR used government spending programs to buy votes.
I found this book very unpleasant. Rather than listen to another chapter in the car, I sometimes found myself playing music.
But we need to read this book. We need to know what really happened, so we can guard against it happening again.
In the next few weeks, I will quote a few of the more memorable and significant passages in Folsom’s book.

Book discussed:
Folsom, Burton W., Jr. New Deal or Raw Deal? How FDR’s Economic Legacy Has Damaged America. New York: Threshold Editions, 2008.

Taxpayers Taking a Haircut as States “Scramble” to Find Something New to Tax

“A LITTLE OFF THE TOP; Michigan residents may have to pay a 5.5 percent tax for haircuts. States across the nation are considering similar taxes on services to solve their budget problems.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. 1) In the scramble to find something, anything, to generate more revenue, states are considering new taxes on virtually everything: garbage pickup, dating services, bowling night, haircuts, even clowns.

“It’s hard enough doing what we do,” grumbled John Luke, a plumber in the Philadelphia suburbs. His services would, for the first time, come with an added tax if the governor has his way.
Opponents of imposing taxes on services like funerals, legal advice, helicopter rides and dry cleaning argue that this push comes as businesses are barely clinging to life and can ill afford to see customers further put off by new taxes. This is especially true, they say, in states like Michigan and Pennsylvania, where some of the most sweeping proposals are being considered this spring.
But this is also a period of economic gloom for states. Pension funds are in the red, federal stimulus help will soon vanish, and revenues from traditional sources like income and property taxes are slumping ever lower, with few elected officials willing to risk voter wrath by raising them.
. . .
(p. 20) But from coast to coast, desperate governments are looking to tap into new revenue streams.
In Nebraska, a lawmaker has introduced a bill to tax armored car services, farm equipment repairs, shoe shines, taxidermy, reflexology and scooter repairs. In Kentucky, Jim Wayne, a state representative, and some fellow Democrats are proposing taxing high-end services: golf greens fees, limousine and hot-air-balloon rides, and private landscaping.
In June, voters in Maine will decide whether to accept a state overhaul of its tax system that would newly tax services like tailor alterations, blimp rides, and entertainment provided by clowns, comedians and jugglers.

For the full story, see:
MONICA DAVEY. “States Seeking Cash Hope to Expand Taxes to Services.” The New York Times, First Section (Sun., ed: March 28, 2010): 1 & 20.
(Note: ellipsis added.)
(Note: the online version of the article is dated March 27, 2010, and has the title “States Seeking Cash Hope to Expand Taxes to Services.”)

Source of graph: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.

Speculators Absorb Risk Others Do Not Want to Bear and They Make Prices More Accurate

(p. A19) Speculators earn a profit by absorbing risk that others don’t want. Without speculators, investors would find it difficult to quickly hedge or sell their positions.

Speculators also provide us with information about the fundamental values of investments. When the fundamentals appear favorable, they buy. Otherwise, they sell. If their forecasts are correct, they profit. This causes prices to more accurately forecast an investment’s value, spreading useful information.

For the full commentary, see:
DARRELL DUFFIE. “In Defense of Financial Speculation; It is not the same thing as market manipulation.” The Wall Street Journal (Weds., FEBRUARY 24, 2010): A19.

Quants Confused Mathematical Models and Reality

Source of book image: http://seekingalpha.com/article/188632-the-quants-review-when-the-money-grid-went-dark

(p. 7) The virtually exclusive use of mathematical models, Mr. Patterson says, was what separated the younger cohorts of quants from their Wall Street forebears. Unlike Warren Buffett or Peter Lynch, the quants did not focus on so-called market fundamentals like what goods or services a particular company actually produced. Seldom if ever did they act on old-fashioned gut instinct. Instead, they focused on factors like how cheap a stock was relative to the rest of the market or how quickly its price had risen or fallen.

Therein was the quants’ flaw, according to Mr. Patterson. Pioneers like Mr. Thorp understood that while the math world and the financial world have much in common, they aren’t always in sync. The quant traders’ model emphasized the most likely moves a stock or bond price could make. It largely ignored the possibility of big jolts caused by human factors, especially investor panics.
“The model soon became so ubiquitous that, hall-of-mirrors-like, it became difficult to tell the difference between the model and the market itself,” Mr. Patterson declares.
Move ahead to August 2007 and beyond, when markets swooned on doubts about subprime mortgages. Stocks that the model predicted were bound to go up went sharply down, and vice versa. Events that were supposed to happen only once in 10,000 years happened three days in a row.

For the full review, see:

HARRY HURT III. “Off the Shelf; In Practice, Stock Formulas Weren’t Perfect.” The New York Times, SundayBusiness Section (Sun., February 21, 2010): 7.
(Note: the online version of the article is dated February 20, 2010.)

The reference to Patterson’s book, is:
Patterson, Scott. The Quants: How a New Breed of Math Whizzes Conquered Wall Street and Nearly Destroyed It. New York: Crown Business, 2010.

Huge Greenhouses Dependably Yield a Variety of Ripe Tomatoes Even in Winter

“Some of the more than 500,000 plants at Backyard Farms at its Maine greenhouse.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited below.

(p. D1) AN icy mixture of rain and sleet fell on the glass roof of Greenhouse Two at Backyard Farms here, but as its big blue door slid open and the warm, green, celery smell of tomato plants wafted out, it was summer.

When it was built three years ago, the company’s first 24-acre greenhouse in Madison was already the largest building in Maine. This second connected greenhouse, completed last year, brought the total area under glass to some 42 acres, or roughly the size of 32 football fields. Even in the depths of winter, a million tomatoes ripen indoors to harvest each week, snipped from their vines by workers in T-shirts and shorts.
. . .
Once, if you wanted tomatoes out of season, you mainly had to settle for hard pink ones picked green in the fields of Florida or Mexico and shipped by truck. Commercial greenhouses could do better, but they were a niche market.
Backed by consumer demand for fresh tomatoes year round, the indoor acreage devoted to growing tomatoes has become nearly six times as large since the early 1990s, said Roberta Cook, a marketing economist who helped write what many in the industry consider to be the definitive report on greenhouse tomatoes in 2005.
Those tough pink ones are still good and cheap enough for most fast food restaurants and the food service industry, which buy about half the fresh tomatoes sold in the United States. But with shoppers willing to pay a pre-(p. D5)mium — even $4 to $5 a pound — for red vine-ripened ones with more flavor, greenhouse tomatoes now represent more than half of every dollar spent on fresh tomatoes in American supermarkets, according to figures from the Perishables Group, a market research firm in Chicago.
. . .
Advances in genetics have allowed breeders to cross-pollinate precisely for control over specific attributes like size, color, disease resistance, firmness for shipping and levels of acids and sugars, the balance of which accounts for the bulk of a tomato’s flavor. Too little sugar turns fruit tart. Too little acid turns it bland. Too little of both leaves tomatoes with little flavor.
As tomatoes ripen on the vine they develop more of those sugars and acids and other flavor elements. But most of the major farms growing tomatoes that are sold fresh year round are in areas where the climate is more hospitable to varieties best picked green.
By creating their own climate — whether in Arizona, Maine or Canada — greenhouses allow growers to pick and ship tomatoes only when they’re ripe.

For the full story, see:
CHRIS LADD. “Endless Summer, Even in Maine.” The New York Times (Weds., March 31, 2010): D1 & D5.
(Note: ellipses added.)
(Note: the online version of the article is dated March 30, 2010, and has the title “Giant Greenhouses Mean Flavorful Tomatoes All Year.”)

“Even as snow falls outside, workers harvest tomatoes year-round at Backyard Farms in Madison, Maine. About 200 of them tend a half-million plants under 42 acres of glass, roughly the same amount of floorspace as in the Chrysler Building.” Source of caption and photo: online version of the NYT article quoted and cited above.

If We Want More Jobs, We Need More (Steve) Jobs

(p. A19) Mr. Obama and his advisers need to grasp this essential fact: Entrepreneurs are not just a cute little subsector of the American economy. They are the whole game. They will give us tomorrow’s Apples and the multiplier effect of small businesses and exciting new jobs that go with them. Entrepreneurs are necessary to keep our large multinationals on their toes. It’s no coincidence that the entrepreneurial flowering of the 1970s forced a managerial revolution in large companies during the 1980s and 1990s. Without Steve Jobs, there would have been no Lou Gerstner to reinvent IBM in the ’90s. Entrepreneurs like Steve Jobs make everyone better.

For the full story, see:
RICH KARLGAARD. “Apple to the Rescue?” The Wall Street Journal (Thurs., JANUARY 28, 2010): A19.